Business Debt Restructuring in New Hampshire: 7 Laws That Change Your Leverage (2026)

The Statutes New Hampshire Never Bothered to Write

Most state pages on this subject open by describing a rule that protects you. New Hampshire is a page about four rules that do not exist, and pretending otherwise would cost you money on the only day it matters, which is the day you sit down to negotiate. There is no interest rate ceiling here that a commercial advance could violate. There is no commercial financing disclosure act requiring your funder to show you a total cost figure before you sign. There is no loan broker statute licensing the person who placed your deal or banning the fee he collected in front. And there is no section of the Revised Statutes Annotated that voids a confession of judgment in a business contract, because the word cognovit does not appear in the New Hampshire code at all.

That combination does something specific to your leverage rather than simply removing it. In a state with a rate cap, the fight over whether your agreement is a purchase of receivables or a disguised loan is worth real money, because winning it opens a statutory remedy. Here, winning that same fight opens almost nothing on price, so the energy that other states spend on recharacterization has to go somewhere more productive, and the productive places in New Hampshire are conduct, procedure and exemptions. A funder that misrepresented something material is exposed under RSA 358-A to double damages as a floor and treble as a ceiling, plus your attorney’s fees, and that statute reaches your company rather than only your customers.

The other four laws run from the paper to the money. Chapter 545-A decides how far back a creditor can reach for transfers you already made, and it still uses the old vocabulary rather than the modern uniform act. RSA 511-A and RSA 512 decide how fast anyone gets to your operating account and what they capture when they get there, and the answer is stranger and slower than the New York procedure your funder’s collection counsel is used to. RSA 480 and RSA 511:2 decide what a personal guaranty actually exposes, and on January 1, 2026 the homestead figure in this state more than tripled. Each of the seven below is keyed to primary text, and where the primary text is unsettled or points somewhere odd, this page says so instead of smoothing it over.

1. No New Hampshire Statute Voids the Confession You Signed

A confession of judgment clause, called a cognovit or a warrant of attorney depending on who drafted it, appoints a lawyer the creditor chooses to walk into a courthouse, admit the debt on your behalf and take a judgment without a summons ever reaching you. Around half the country has written that device out of commercial contracts by statute, and the quickest way to confirm that New Hampshire has not is to run the words through the General Court’s own full text search of the Revised Statutes Annotated. The term “cognovit” returns nothing. The phrase “warrant of attorney” returns nothing. The phrase “confession of judgment” returns six sections and the phrase “confess judgment” returns five, and every one of those sections is aimed at a consumer or a specialty transaction rather than at commercial credit.

Read the list and the pattern is unmistakable. RSA 358-P:7, I(a) forbids a confession of judgment in a rent-to-own agreement. RSA 361-A:15 and RSA 361-A:16 forbid one in a retail installment contract for a motor vehicle. RSA 361-D:5 forbids one in a consumer motor vehicle lease. RSA 399-A:15, VI bars a licensee under the small loan chapter from taking a confession of judgment or a power of attorney to confess, and RSA 399-A:15, VIII(b) bars the clause from any small loan contract, which that chapter defines at RSA 399-A:1, XX as credit of $10,000 or less made for personal, family or household use. RSA 540:13-c reaches landlord and tenant matters. Nothing in that list touches an advance to your LLC, and the legislature that wrote five separate consumer bans plainly knew how to write a sixth if it had wanted one.

New Hampshire’s own enacted commercial code goes a step further in the other direction. RSA 382-A:3-104(a)(3) lists the terms a promise to pay may carry without losing negotiable instrument status, and subparagraph (ii) expressly names “an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral.” That is the code treating the device as an ordinary commercial term rather than as contraband. A recovery desk prices that difference deliberately, because a file in which the borrower has already surrendered the right to be heard costs a fraction of a contested one to convert into money, and cheap conversion is precisely what sets the discount a funder is willing to take when you eventually call to settle.

The honest limit on all of this is that New Hampshire also supplies no procedure for entering a confessed judgment, no clerk’s form for it, and no reported modern decision from the New Hampshire Supreme Court passing on whether a commercial cognovit clause can be enforced here at all. We looked, we did not find one, and inventing a rule in either direction would serve you worse than saying so. What actually happens in these files is that the confession is taken in New York under the forum clause on page nine and then brought here under RSA 524-A, the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, where RSA 524-A:2 gives the filed judgment the same effect as a New Hampshire judgment and RSA 524-A:3, III blocks any execution for fifteen days after filing. Those fifteen days are the entire window, and they belong to counsel the same afternoon the clerk’s notice arrives.

2. The Word Usury Appears Once in the Entire Code

New Hampshire has no general usury ceiling, and the code demonstrates that almost by accident. Searching the full Revised Statutes Annotated for the word “usury” produces exactly one hit, RSA 415-B:8, III, which sits in the premium finance company chapter and says only that certain delinquency and cancellation charges “shall not be considered directly or indirectly in determining whether a violation of the usury laws has occurred under a premium finance agreement.” That is a cross-reference to a body of law this state no longer maintains. Searching for “usurious” returns nothing at all.

What replaced the ceiling is RSA 336:1, I, and it is a default rule rather than a limit. It provides that the annual rate of interest in all business transactions in which interest is paid or secured “unless otherwise agreed upon in writing, shall equal 10 percent,” carves consumer credit transactions as defined in RSA 358-K:1, V out of that paragraph entirely, and then adds the sentence that decides your file: “If agreed upon in writing, interest on business transactions may include charging other than simple interest.” The ten percent figure applies only when the parties wrote nothing. Your funding agreement wrote something, so ten percent has nothing to say to it, and RSA 336:2, II fixes whatever rate you agreed to as of the date the agreement was made.

The consequence reorders the whole argument. In New York or California, showing that a receivables purchase is really a loan opens a statutory door, because a loan at that effective rate violates something. In New Hampshire the same showing opens a door into an empty room, since there is no rate a business loan can exceed and no forfeiture provision waiting on the other side. The only rate regulation in this state runs through RSA 399-A, and RSA 399-A:1, XX limits that chapter to credit of $10,000 or less made for personal, family or household use, plus title and payday loans. The legislature even wrote an anti-evasion clause into RSA 399-A:2, III reaching anyone who tries to dodge the chapter “by any device, subterfuge, or pretense, including, without limitation, calling a loan by any other name,” which tells you it understood the problem and chose to solve it only for consumers.

One number does still follow you, and it is the judgment rate. RSA 336:1, II sets the annual simple rate on judgments, including prejudgment interest, by formula: the prevailing discount rate on 26-week United States Treasury bills at the last auction before the last day of September, plus two percentage points, rounded to the nearest tenth, certified each December by the state treasurer to the Administrative Office of the Courts. The published figures move a great deal, running 2.0 percent for calendar 2022, 7.3 percent for 2024 and 6.2 percent for 2025, with the Judicial Branch posting the current year on its civil interest rates page, and under RSA 336:2, I the rate that attaches is the one in effect when the verdict or finding is rendered. A judgment that sits for four years at a rate in that upper range is materially larger than the one that was entered, which is a reason to resolve early rather than to wait and see.

3. No Disclosure Act, No Broker License, No Regulator to Call

As of August 2026 the Revised Statutes Annotated contain no commercial financing disclosure requirement of any kind. The state’s own full text search returns a single hit for “commercial financing,” and it is RSA 382-A:2-323 on bills of lading in overseas shipment, while “sales-based financing” and “merchant cash advance” each come back with an empty result set. Eleven jurisdictions now require a funder to hand a small business a disclosure sheet before funding, and New Hampshire is not one of them, which means no total repayment figure, no estimated annual percentage rate, no finance charge line and no prepayment disclosure is owed to you as a matter of state law.

The gap on the broker side is wider and matters more, because the broker is usually the person who told you the story that got you here. Several states with no disclosure act still run a Loan Broker Act that licenses the intermediary, bans advance fees and puts felony exposure behind it, and Nebraska’s version at Neb. Rev. Stat. sections 45-189 through 45-191.11 is the fullest example. Searching the New Hampshire code for “loan broker” returns zero sections. Searching for “advance fee” returns two, one in the real estate licensing chapter and one in RSA 397-A:14 on mortgage lending, and neither reaches an independent sales organization placing a receivables purchase for a trucking company in Nashua.

The two chapters that look like they might reach a broker do not, and it is worth knowing why before you pay someone to find out. RSA 359-D, the Credit Services Organizations chapter, carries a genuine advance fee restriction at RSA 359-D:3, I and a damages provision at RSA 359-D:11, but RSA 359-D:2, I defines “buyer” as “any natural person,” and RSA 359-D:2, III defines the extension of credit it covers as credit “offered or granted primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Your company is neither. RSA 399-E:1 makes a “loan scam operator” guilty of a felony carrying a $10,000 fine and one year of imprisonment, which sounds promising until you read the definition, which requires a person who advertises to lend money for a prepaid fee “without any source of supply for such money and with no intent to provide such money.” A broker who actually placed your deal and took a fee does not meet that test.

What fills the space is contract, Article 9 and RSA 358-A, in that order. The reconciliation clause, the default and acceleration terms, the payoff letters sent to the prior positions and the actual amounts wired into your account are all enforceable promises whether or not anybody had to disclose them, and the gap between what a broker said and what the paper does is exactly where the Consumer Protection Act claim in item six lives. The UCC-1 filings that sit against your receivables are searchable at the Secretary of State and govern priority under RSA 382-A:9-322. New Hampshire owners who understand that no regulator is coming tend to build the documentary record early, and we walk through what that record looks like on our page for business debt settlement companies in New Hampshire.

4. Chapter 545-A Still Calls the Transfer Fraudulent

Most states replaced the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act with the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act and swapped the loaded word out of the operative sections. New Hampshire did not. RSA 545-A:12 still reads “This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,” the whole chapter still carries the 1987 enactment date with a January 1, 1988 effective date, and RSA 545-A:4 is still headed “Transfers Fraudulent as to Present and Future Creditors.” That is not cosmetic. When a creditor’s counsel writes to your accountant about a transfer, the word on the caption is fraudulent, and the emotional temperature of the conversation you are about to have with your business partner is set by that word before anyone reaches the elements.

The elements themselves are the familiar two tracks. RSA 545-A:4, I(a) reaches a transfer made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor,” and RSA 545-A:4, II lists eleven badges a court may weigh, including whether the transfer went to an insider, whether you kept possession or control afterward, whether it was concealed, whether you had already been sued or threatened with suit, whether it moved substantially all of your assets, and whether it happened shortly before or after a substantial debt was incurred. RSA 545-A:4, I(b) and RSA 545-A:5, I reach transfers made without reasonably equivalent value where you were insolvent or left with unreasonably small assets, and no intent needs proving on that track at all. RSA 545-A:5, II reaches a payment to an insider on an old debt while insolvent where the insider had reasonable cause to know it.

The deadlines are where planning either works or blows up, and RSA 545-A:9 sets three of them. An actual intent claim under RSA 545-A:4, I(a) is extinguished unless brought within four years after the transfer, or within one year after it was or reasonably could have been discovered if that is later, which is the clause that quietly makes the outside date longer than four years whenever the transfer was not obvious from your filings. The constructive claims under RSA 545-A:4, I(b) and RSA 545-A:5, I get a flat four years with no discovery extension. The insider preference claim under RSA 545-A:5, II gets one year and nothing more.

There are real defenses and most owners never hear about them. RSA 545-A:8, I protects a transferee who took in good faith and for reasonably equivalent value against an actual intent claim. RSA 545-A:8, V(b) provides that a transfer is not voidable where it results from enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Article 9, which matters when a secured party has swept collateral. RSA 545-A:8, VI(c) protects an insider transfer made “pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor” where it secured present value as well as antecedent debt, which is the clause a properly documented owner loan into a struggling company is supposed to sit inside. None of that is a reason to move assets, and moving assets while a creditor is circling is how a workable restructuring turns into a personal judgment. Build the transfer timeline first, hand it to counsel, and let the plan be shaped around what is already true.

5. What It Takes to Reach the Operating Account Here

New Hampshire does not have a restraining notice, and it does not have continuing bank garnishment. What it has is attachment. RSA 511-A:1 requires that a defendant “shall be given notice and an opportunity for a preliminary hearing before any pre-judgment attachment, including attachments of property held by a trustee, shall be made.” The notice text is prescribed by RSA 511-A:2 and has to be incorporated prominently in the writ, telling you in four numbered sentences that the plaintiff intends to attach, that you may object, that the objection is due on or before the return date, and that failing to object by that date waives it. That last sentence is where most owners lose the account, because the paper looks like ordinary litigation boilerplate and the deadline runs while nobody is reading it.

If you do object, RSA 511-A:3 puts the hearing within fourteen days of the objection and puts the burden on the plaintiff to show “a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover judgment including interest and costs on any amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment.” Even after the plaintiff carries that burden, the section lets you defeat the attachment by establishing that your assets will be sufficient to satisfy the judgment. Going around all of this ex parte is possible but narrow: RSA 511-A:8 requires probable cause on the merits plus one of five listed circumstances, of which the realistic one in a commercial file is substantial danger that the property will be concealed or removed from the state.

After judgment the picture inverts, and this is the part funders’ counsel actually rely on. RSA 511:1 provides that attachable property “may be attached following the entry of judgment for the plaintiff,” and RSA 511-A:1 says its own chapter “shall apply only to pre-judgment attachments,” so the notice and hearing sequence above does not repeat. What the judgment creditor gets is still a snapshot rather than a faucet. Under RSA 512:9-b a bank may be served only upon an officer, branch supervisor or head teller, only between 8:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Monday through Friday excluding bank holidays, and is chargeable only for what is in its hands at the time of service, reduced by account fees and by amounts alleged not to belong to you. RSA 512:9-c confirms the trustee has “no duty to collect” anything that comes in afterward, and RSA 512:3 gives the trustee thirty days to return the disclosure form or risk default.

Two exemptions inside that chapter are worth memorizing before you move a dollar. RSA 512:21, XI exempts “money, rights, and credits of the defendant deposited in any account designated as a payroll account,” and RSA 512:21, II exempts wages up to fifty times the federal minimum hourly wage per week in an action founded on a New Hampshire judgment. Alongside all of this sits RSA 524:6-a, which lets the court inquire into ability to pay and order periodic payments enforceable by civil contempt, and which provides that once such an order issues no writ of execution may be issued without prior notice to you unless the parties agree otherwise. The clock is long: RSA 508:5 allows an action of debt on a judgment for twenty years, and RSA 524:13 creates a judgment lien on real estate by recording a certified copy with the registry of deeds. We take that scenario apart elsewhere on our page about a UCC lien freezing a bank account.

6. Your Company Is a Person Under RSA 358-A

Most state unfair practices acts stop at the consumer, and on a page like this that limitation is usually the whole story. New Hampshire is the exception. RSA 358-A:2 makes it unlawful “for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state,” with no consumer qualifier anywhere in the sentence. RSA 358-A:1, I defines person to include “natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entity.” RSA 358-A:10, I opens the private action to “any person injured.” Read together those three provisions put your LLC on the plaintiff’s side of the caption.

That reading is not ours. In Milford Lumber Co. v. RCB Realty, Inc., 147 N.H. 15 (2001), the defendants argued precisely that the chapter protects consumers and gives no private action to a seller. The New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the argument on the plain language, held that “RSA chapter 358-A does not bar sellers from availing themselves of its protection,” affirmed judgment for a lumber supplier, and affirmed the fee award under RSA 358-A:10. The court acknowledged in the same opinion that its reading is “very broad, and may permit suits beyond what the legislature intended,” and a justice dissented, so this is a settled holding rather than a comfortable one. The court has since decided business against business claims on the merits repeatedly, including Hair Excitement, Inc. v. L’Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 158 N.H. 363 (2009) and Axenics, Inc. v. Turner Construction Co., 164 N.H. 659 (2013).

What you win if you win is the reason funders’ counsel take this claim seriously in New Hampshire when they shrug at the equivalent claim in states whose acts stop at the consumer. RSA 358-A:10, I sets recovery at actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater, and then provides that on a willful or knowing violation the court “shall award as much as 3 times, but not less than 2 times, such amount,” which makes doubling the floor rather than the ceiling once willfulness is found. A prevailing plaintiff is awarded costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, and any attempted waiver of those damages is void and unenforceable, so the waiver paragraph in your funding agreement does not reach it. RSA 358-A:6, I is the provision nobody quotes: a violation of RSA 358-A:2 is a misdemeanor if the violator is a natural person and a felony if it is anything else, which describes every funding company you have ever dealt with. Under RSA 358-A:4, III(b) the Attorney General can seek civil penalties up to $10,000 per violation.

The authority pointing the other way is the authority that describes most files. New Hampshire screens ordinary commercial unpleasantness out through the rascality test, which asks whether the conduct “attain[ed] a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce,” and Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 390 (1996) adds that “selfish bargaining and business dealings will not be enough.” An ordinary breach of contract is not a violation. In Axenics the subcontractor lost on exactly that ground even though the general contractor had privately rebutted its payment claims, and in Hair Excitement the salon lost even though the trial court found that the defendant’s investigator had misrepresented both his identity and his intent. RSA 358-A:3, IV-a adds a three-year window running from when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known, and Hair Excitement holds there is no right to a jury trial on a RSA 358-A:10 claim, so a judge decides whether your funder was a rascal.

7. The $400,000 You Have to Claim in Writing

On January 1, 2026 the New Hampshire homestead right went from $120,000 to $400,000. RSA 480:1, I now entitles every person to $400,000 worth of a homestead or an interest in one, and RSA 480:1, III caps homestead exemptions claimed against a single property at $550,000 in total, or $400,000 for a single person. The change came in 2025, chapter 282, section 1, from House Bill 617, and it is one of the largest statutory homestead figures in the country. Two smaller additions in the same act matter as much to a guarantor. RSA 480:1, II requires that the residence “must have been continuously used as a primary residence for the previous 12 months,” with proceeds protected if reinvested within six months, and RSA 480:1, IV allows the full market value to be claimed where the debt arose from unpaid medical bills or other debts directly resulting from terminal or catastrophic injury or illness.

The exceptions list at RSA 480:4 also grew in 2025, and paragraph VI is the one a funder’s counsel will read first. The homestead right does not stand against “debts existing at the time that the homestead was purchased,” subject only to the reinvestment provision in RSA 480:1, II. If your advance went bad in 2024 and you bought the house in 2025, that exception is aimed directly at you. The other exceptions run to taxes, forfeited bail bonds and domestic support obligations, mechanics’ liens for work on the home itself, mortgages, homeowner and condominium association assessments, and levies made as the chapter provides.

New Hampshire also does not hand you the exemption. RSA 529:20-a requires a judgment creditor levying on real estate to mail you a specific notice by certified mail, and that notice tells you what the statute actually demands: you must notify the sheriff of the county and the judgment creditor of the amount of your homestead claim in writing. Do it before the sale and the sheriff must pay you the exemption before paying the creditor from the proceeds, and the sheriff may not sell the property for less than the claimed exemption without a further court order. Do it after the sale and the creditor need not pay you until the one-year redemption period under RSA 529:26 expires. The same dollar amount produces two very different years of your life depending on when a letter went out.

Everything else a guaranty exposes sits in RSA 511:2, and the figures are modest against a six-figure judgment. Household furniture is protected to $3,500, tools of the debtor’s occupation to $5,000, one automobile to $10,000, jewelry to $500, books to $800, provisions and fuel to $400, and one computer without a stated value. The wildcard at RSA 511:2, XVIII adds $1,000 in any property plus up to $7,000 of the unused portion of the furniture, provisions, books, tools, automobile and jewelry exemptions. RSA 511:2, XIX exempts qualified retirement plans and arrangements, expressly subject to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, and RSA 524:6-a, II shelters retirement income from a periodic payment order up to fifty times the federal minimum hourly wage per week. None of that reaches business assets your company pledged, which is why the guaranty question and the entity question have to be worked separately, and we cover the first at length on fighting a personal guarantee on an MCA.

The New York Clause on Page Nine, and What RSA 508-A Does With It

Almost every merchant cash advance agreement signed by a New Hampshire business selects New York law and a New York forum, and owners routinely assume that settles it. New Hampshire has a statute directly on the point, and it is more generous to you than the common law of most states. RSA 508-A:3, the Uniform Model Choice of Forum Act, provides that where the parties agreed in writing that an action shall be brought only in another state and it is brought here, a New Hampshire court “will dismiss or stay the action, as appropriate,” unless one of five things is true.

The five are worth knowing individually. A New Hampshire court keeps the case if a statute requires it to, if the plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other state for reasons other than delay, or if the other state would be a substantially less convenient place for trial. It also keeps the case where the agreement as to place “was obtained by misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other unconscionable means,” or where it would “for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable to enforce the agreement.” The fourth is a named statutory handle rather than a general unconscionability argument. Abuse of economic power also happens to describe a fifth-position advance signed at eleven at night to cover Friday payroll rather better than most contract doctrines manage to.

None of that is a plan by itself, and it is worth being blunt about what it does not do. RSA 508-A:3 governs what a New Hampshire court does with a case filed here; it does not stop a New York court from hearing a case filed there, and it does not undo a New York judgment once one exists, because full faith and credit and RSA 524-A take over at that point and leave you attacking jurisdiction rather than merits. The moment it is useful is before a judgment, when the question is where the fight happens and what that geography costs each side, and a funder that has to litigate in Concord or Manchester against local counsel is carrying a very different expense line than one filing a stack of New York papers.

The reason this belongs on a restructuring page rather than a litigation page is that venue is priced into every settlement conversation whether or not anyone says so. A receivables desk discounts a file by what it expects recovery to cost, and cost is mostly counsel hours and elapsed months. When the New Hampshire answer to a forum clause is a statute with five enumerated exceptions instead of a shrug, the expected cost of collection goes up on the funder’s side of the ledger, and the number it will accept moves with it.

What Order to Work Them In

Seven statutes is a menu, and a file worked as a menu goes nowhere. The order that produces movement starts with the two that have deadlines attached, because everything else waits. If a foreign judgment has been filed here, RSA 524-A:3, III gives fifteen days before execution can issue and that is the whole runway. If a writ carrying the RSA 511-A:2 notice of intent to attach has been served, the objection is due on or before the return date and failing to file it waives the hearing that RSA 511-A:3 would otherwise put on the calendar within fourteen days.

Next comes the record, and this is the unglamorous work that decides what any of it is worth. Pull every funding agreement and addendum, the broker’s emails and text messages, the bank statements showing what was actually funded against what the payoff letters said, the reconciliation requests you sent and what came back, and a current UCC search from the Secretary of State showing every filing against your receivables and the order they were made in. The RSA 358-A claim in item six is built entirely out of that pile, and its three-year window under RSA 358-A:3, IV-a runs from when you knew or reasonably should have known, which means the date on the first misleading document is a date worth pinning down early.

Then the transfer timeline, which is defensive rather than offensive. List every payment to an owner, relative, affiliate or other insider for the last four years, every asset that left the company, and what came back in exchange, because RSA 545-A:9 sets the reach and RSA 545-A:4, II tells you which of those entries a creditor will characterize as a badge. Doing this before a plan is drawn is what keeps a restructuring from creating a second lawsuit, and doing it after is how owners end up personally liable for a distribution they had forgotten about.

Only then does the settlement conversation make sense, because by then you know three things the funder does not assume you know: what its collection actually costs in this state, whether its own conduct hands you a statute with a fee-shifting provision, and what a judgment against you personally would really reach once RSA 480:1 and RSA 511:2 are applied. Every discount a receivables desk grants is a purchase of certainty, and in this state the uncertainty you can hand it has specific statutory addresses rather than rhetorical ones.

Who Should You Call? Our Top-Rated Business Debt Firms

One firm on this list works the entire lifecycle of a business debt file, from stopping the daily debits through attorney-led negotiation, UCC lien removal, and a signed release. The other two cover broader debt categories that often sit alongside the advances. Choose accordingly.